Abstract

Wittgenstein took the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ to be eventually invalidated by logical atomism. Our main thesis is that it can be revalidated, provided that we subtract the thesis 2.02 (“The object is simple.”) from it: atoms are not simple objects but, rather, bits of information the objects are made of. Starting from an introductory discussion about what is meant by a ‘logic of colors’, an explanatory framework is then proposed in the form of a partition semantics. The philosophical problem of Wittgenstein’s color-statements is reformulated accordingly, thus overcoming the trouble with logical atomism. A Boolean treatment is advanced to solve the initial difficulty and leads to two final results: Wittgenstein’s logic of colors requires a mereological understanding of the relations between colors in order to make sense; the analysis of psychophysical concepts like colors casts some additional doubt about the analytic–synthetic distinction, to the point of treating relations between colors as analytic a posteriori judgments.