Abstract

The aim of my dissertation is to clarify the proper role of character in moral philosophy. The dissertation is organized around two issues: the alleged importance of character for understanding moral responsibility; character's relation to living a good and meaningful life. ;In Chapter One, through an analysis of Aristotle and Kant, I show that the concept of character, as it was traditionally understood, was neither necessary nor sufficient for ascribing responsibility. The analysis of Hume's conception of character in Chapter Two yields similar conclusions, even though Hume thought that character was the only possible object of moral evaluation--at least in the case of the natural virtues. This shows that only at most a thin notion of character is warranted in the moral theories of Aristotle and Hume. I argue in Chapter Three that even in light of more recent and sophisticated theories on the subject, we can still understand responsibility without character. However, there remains a residual concern that in dismissing the idea of character, as it is traditionally conceived, we are dismissing something important, because a person's character seems to define her true self and makes it possible to live a good and unified life, a life of integrity. I argue in Chapter Four that from the fact that we find a certain set of traits useful for thinking about ourselves and our lives, we should not conclude that this is a true self, where truth is to be valued and preserved. I argue that there may not be, in any strict sense, any truths about ourselves to know. Accordingly, the maxim "'be true to yourself" not only loses its urgency, but perhaps also its sense