The Idealistic Implications of Bell’s Theorem

Idealistic Studies 19 (2):131-140 (1989)
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Abstract

A number of physicists have recently been espousing what appears to be a strong form of subjective idealism. Clauser and Horne, professors of physics at Berkeley and Stonehill College, respectively, for example, report.

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00468541

DOI

10.5840/idstudies198919214

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