Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding

Noûs 53 (3):639-663 (2019)
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Abstract

In this essay, I develop and defend a virtue‐theoretic conception of rationality as a capacity whose function is understanding, as opposed to mere truth or correctness. I focus on two main potential advantages of this view. First, its ability to explain the rationality of forms of explanatory reasoning, and second, its ability to offer a more unified account of theoretical and practical rationality.

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2017-10-27

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Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

A system of rational faculties: Additive or transformative?Karl Schafer - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):918-936.
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.
Moral worth and skillful action.David Horst - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):657-675.
How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.

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References found in this work

Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.

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