Number sentences and specificational sentences: Reply to Moltmann

Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2173-2192 (2015)
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Abstract

Frege proposed that sentences like ‘The number of planets is eight’ be analysed as identity statements in which the number words refer to numbers. Recently, Friederike Moltmann argued that, pace Frege, such sentences be analysed as so-called specificational sentences in which the number words have the same non-referring semantic function as the number word ‘eight’ in ‘There are eight planets’. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that Moltmann fails to show that such sentences should be analysed as specificational sentences. Second, I show that even if they are to be analysed in this way, Moltmann’s proposed specificational analysis is unsatisfactory.

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Robert Schwartzkopff
University of Oxford (DPhil)

Citations of this work

Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):161-178.

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References found in this work

Ontology Made Easy.Amie Lynn Thomasson - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.
Reference to numbers in natural language.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
Number determiners, numbers, and arithmetic.Thomas Hofweber - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):179-225.
A Priority and Existence.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke, New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 197--228.

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