Kierkegaard on 'Truth Is Subjectivity' and 'The Leap of Faith'

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):297 - 313 (1973)
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Abstract

One of the things for which Kierkegaard is both best known to English and American philosophers and most criticized by them, is his contention that “truth is subjectivity.” His discussion of “truth” and “subjectivity” occupies a considerable part of his most important philosophical work, Concluding Unscientific Postscript; and his contention that “truth is subjectivity” is the pivotal claim around which virtually the entire work revolves. Yet few of Kierkegaard's claims have been more frequently misunderstood; and a misunderstanding of this claim has led many philosophers wrongly to dismiss him as unworthy of serious consideration.

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Using Lectio Divina as an in-class contemplative tool.Jake Wright - 2019 - Journal of Contemplative Inquiry 6 (1):71-93.

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Science of Logic.M. J. Petry, G. W. F. Hegel, A. V. Miller & J. N. Findlay - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):273.

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