Abstract

Now it is tempting to try to generalize the view that means-ends considerations play a part in determining what is the right theory. It is tempting, that is, to try to use a similar view to give an account of the nature of truth or knowledge quite generally. For can we not say that truth is simply what we ought to believe, and that knowledge is what we are justified in believing? After all, terms like "true," "false," "probable," "doubtful," "known," "believed," and so on, are not merely descriptive terms. They are used to evaluate the degree to which a belief or proposition is one which we ought to accept. And if in the case of so important an area of human knowledge as scientific theory what we ought to accept is determined in large part by means-ends considerations, may it not be true that in other areas of human knowledge means-ends considerations have a similar function? Perhaps it would even be possible to define truth, or knowledge, in terms of what serves some end or purpose.