Gigerenzer’s Evolutionary Arguments against Rational Choice Theory: An Assessment

Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1272-1282 (2011)
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Abstract

I critically discuss a recent innovation in the debate surrounding the plausibility of rational choice theory : the appeal to evolutionary theory. Specifically, I assess Gigerenzer and colleagues’ claim that considerations based on natural selection show that, instead of making decisions in a RCT-like way, we rely on ‘simple heuristics’. As I try to make clearer here, though, Gigerenzer and colleagues’ arguments are unconvincing: we lack the needed information about our past to determine whether the premises on which they are built are true—and, hence, we cannot tell whether they, in fact, speak against RCT.

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Armin W. Schulz
University of Kansas

References found in this work

Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247.
Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement.Tim Maudlin & Nancy Cartwright - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (11):599.
Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis.Richard Samuels - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
Thinking About Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making.John L. Pollock - 2006 - , US: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Pollock.

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