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Conceptual atomism rethought
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):224-225 (2010)
Abstract
Focusing on Machery's claim that concepts play entirely different roles in philosophy and psychology, I explain how one well-known philosophical theory of concepts, Conceptual Atomism (CA), when properly understood, takes into account both kinds of rolesAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Machery’s Alternative to Concepts and the Problem of Content.Bernardo Pino & Bernardo Aguilera - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):671-691.
Language, Mind, and Cognitive Science: Remarks on Theories of the Language-Cognition Relationships in Human Minds.Guillaume Beaulac - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
References found in this work
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
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