Bad News for Ardent Normative Realists?

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2021)
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Abstract

According to Ardent Normative Realists, reality favors certain ways of valuing and acting. Matti Eklund has recently argued that Ardent Normative Realists are committed to Referential Normativity, i.e., the thesis that the action-guiding and motivational roles associated with normative predicates determine their reference. In this paper, we argue that Referential Normativity should be rejected.

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Author Profiles

Francois Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne

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