Ineffability and revenge

Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):797-809 (2020)
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Abstract

In recent work Philip Welch has proven the existence of ‘ineffable liars’ for Hartry Field’s theory of truth. These are offered as liar-like sentences that escape classification in Field’s transfinite hierarchy of determinateness operators. In this article I present a slightly more general characterization of the ineffability phenomenon, and discuss its philosophical significance. I show the ineffable sentences to be less ‘liar-like’ than they appear in Welch’s presentation. I also point to some open technical problems whose resolution would greatly clarify the philosophical issues raised by the ineffability phenomenon.

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Chris Scambler
New York University

Citations of this work

Some observations on truth hierarchies: A correction.Philip D. Welch - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):857-860.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes.Hartry Field - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
Solving the paradoxes, escaping revenge.Hartry Field - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), The Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
Ultimate truth vis- à- vis stable truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.
Some observations on truth hierarchies.P. D. Welch - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-30.

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