Cognitive science and the problem of semantic content

Synthese 70 (February):247-69 (1987)
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Abstract

The problem of semantic content is the problem of explicating those features of brain processes by virtue of which they may properly be thought to possess meaning or reference. This paper criticizes the account of semantic content associated with fodor's version of cognitive science, And offers an alternative account based on mathematical communication theory. Its key concept is that of a neuronal representation maintaining a high-Level of mutual information with a designated external state of affairs under changing conditions of perceptual presentation

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Citations of this work

Causal dispositions + sensory experience = intentionality.Karl Pfeifer - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):757.
Intentionality is a red herring.Chris Fields & Eric Dietrich - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):756.
Various senses of “intentional system”.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):760.
Information and the holism of intentional content.Robert Van Gulick - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):759.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

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