Absences, presences and sufficient conditions

Analysis 64 (4):354-57 (2004)
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Abstract

In this paper, I defend the claim that the determination conditions for thought must include absences.

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Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex

Citations of this work

Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox.Sarah Sawyer - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-93.

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References found in this work

A Slim Book about Narrow Content.Gabriel Segal - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):657-660.
Sufficient absences.S. Sawyer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):202-208.
Against absence-dependent thoughts.P. Noonan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):92-93.

Add more references