The Early Reception of Bernard Williams’ Reduplication Argument

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (3):326-345 (2017)
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Abstract

The reduplication argument advanced by Bernard Williams in 1956 has greatly stimulated the contemporary debate on personal identity. The argument relies on a famous thought experiment that, although not new in the history of philosophy, has engaged some of the most influential contemporary philosophers on the topic. I propose here an interpretation of the argument and a reconstruction of the early reception that Williams’ paper had in the 6 years immediately after its publication. The works discussed include papers by C. B. Martin, G. C. Nerlich, R. Coburn, and J. M. Shorter.

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Andrea Sauchelli
Lingnan University

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