Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds

Philosophia 40 (2):403-409 (2012)
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Abstract

I formulate and defend two sceptical theses on specific parts of our modal knowledge (unqualified and absolute modalities). My main point is that unqualified modal sentences are defective in that they fail to belong unambiguously to specific modal kinds and thus cannot be evaluated; hence, we must be sceptical of beliefs involving them

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Andrea Sauchelli
Lingnan University

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

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