Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is twofold: first, to provide an account of the notion of creativity, and second, to consider some aspects of the scope of the concept of creativity, in particular whether it makes sense to speak of creativity in science. ;With regard to the first issue, I argue that creativity consists in the production of a radically new intelligibility and that for this production special, creative processes are required. The latter point is established through an analysis of non-creative processes, which in turn is provided in terms of Kant's notion of schemata, interpreted as patterns of cognition. My claim is that these processes are not sufficient to bring about the radically new intelligibility that characterizes creative outcomes. The creative process is properly to be analysed through a consideration of Kant's conception of artistic genius and reference to some recent work in psychology. ;The final chapter treats the second issue, the topic of creativity in the sciences. I question whether it makes sense to speak of creativity in science. I argue that since the sciences provide radically novel, yet intelligible, ways of understanding the world, creativity is required here as well.