Abstract

Skepticism has been appeared as a threat to epistemology from the time of Greek Philosophy. It claims that no certain or absolute knowledge can be attained by man. This position was advanced by such Greek schools as the sophists and the pyrrhonists. The story is not very different in Indian philosophical discourse. In Indian philosophical realm skeptics are mainly known as Vaitaṇdikas. In the names of Sarvaśūnyavādīns and Vaitaṇdikas here the skeptics have tried their best to disprove the claim of knowledge. In Indian philosophical literature knowledge or valid knowledge has been described as Pramā, and the instrument of valid knowledge as Pramāṇa. The Vaitaṇdikas and Sarvaśūnyavādīns tried to point out that there is inconsistency in the notion of pramā and pramāṇa. Sarvaśūnyavādīn like Nāgārjuna used a typical technique to refute the Nyāya categories. In his work like Vigrahavyavartanī and Vaidalyaprakaraṇa. Nāgārjuna is mainly concerned with the refutation of pramāṇa and prameya dichotomy. In this present paper I will try to emphasized the argument which given by Nāgārjuna in his famous treatise Vaidalyaprakaraṇa try to establish confusion between pramāṇa and prameya dichotomy, which accept by the Naiyāyikas.