Decir lo mismo

Sapientia 45 (75):31 (1990)
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Abstract

The article considers the possibility of saying the same truth in different expressions. It is relevant the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. The author shows the deep difference between the objective Fregean notion of truth and Aquinas' version, according to which the truth of the proposition is related, in many cases, to the situation of the speaker.

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Juan José Sanguineti
Pontifical University Of The Holy Cross

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