Bilateralism, Independence and Coordination

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):23-27 (2018)
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Abstract

Bilateralism is a theory of meaning according to which assertion and denial are independent speech acts. Bilateralism also proposes two coordination principles for assertion and denial. I argue that if assertion and denial are independent speech acts, they cannot be coordinated by the bilateralist principles.

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Gonçalo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa

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Rejection.Timothy Smiley - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):1–9.

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