Abstract

This article examines Donna Haraway’s critique of philosopher Jacques Derrida regarding his inability to transcend the philosophical tradition when considering the animal as an Other. Haraway praises Derrida for going beyond Emmanuel Levinas, his predecessor and friend, by recognizing the animal as an Other, something Levinas, in his ethics of alterity, had not fully done. Building on this critique, the text aims to investigate Haraway’s assumptions, her relationship with the authors she cites, and the relevance of her indirect critique of Levinas. The goal is to explore how Haraway’s ideas on environmental ethics interact with Levinasian philosophy, suggesting that, despite some divergences, Levinas’ ethical proposal offers significant contributions for thinking about a broader ethical responsibility that includes not only humans but all living beings. The analysis suggests that Haraway’s philosophy, while emphasizing ecology and environmental preservation, does not necessarily oppose Levinasian ethics, but can be complemented by it, especially regarding the responsibility for other forms of life on the planet.