Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the topic of the structure of belief states. It begins with a reflection on cognitive puzzles generated by belief reports. According to the Content Principle, there is only one element of mental attitudes that can make a difference as to the truth value of an attitude report: namely, the content attributed to the agent by the that-clause of the report. According to another extended view, Innocent Semantics, referential uses of singular terms in the that-clauses of belief reports contribute objects to the propositions expressed by these that-clauses. The conjunction of the Content Principle and Innocent Semantics seems incompatible with the ordinary assignments of truth-value to reports we realize on de dicto contexts. One can propose to solve this puzzle by either abandoning Innocent Semantics or the Content Principle, or by adopting a revisionist attitude towards ordinary judgments of truth-value for belief reports. In the dissertation I argue against the first and third of the mentioned options, and propose a line of research based on the abandonment of the Content Principle. ;The mentioned line of research leads me to examine and characterize different elements of the structure of belief reflected in reports, which I incorporate in what I call the Notions and Ideas Model. This model allows for a simple treatment of cognitive puzzle cases. Among the different elements of the structure of belief I single out we find implicit and explicit modes of recognition, and different traits of notions, such as their ephemeral, permanent and normal characters. I conclude proposing an account of what it is for a notion to be a self-notion. ;I finally argue that the abandonment of the Content Principle and the acceptance of the fact that a variety of features of the structure of belief is reflected in reports has implications for a theory of the explanation of behavior. I propose that in our explanations of behavior we attribute people complex properties that have among its constituents different aspects of the structure of their beliefs, which include content but are not reducible to it