Why Don't Concepts Constitute a Natural Kind?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):222 - 223 (2010)
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Abstract

Machery argues that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. We argue that this is a mistake. When appropriately construed, his discussion in fact bolsters the claim that concepts are a natural kind

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Author Profiles

Richard Samuels
Ohio State University
Michael Ferreira
Ohio State University

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References found in this work

Concepts are not a natural kind.Edouard Machery - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.
What Realism Implies and What it Does Not.Richard Boyd - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.

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