Abstract

My contribution aims at drawing a new way of inclusion in the citizenry as alternative to the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This way should be able to include the so called ‘unreasonable’ in the public debate. These people are ‘unreasonable’ as they do not share public values but firmly hold a traditional set of values often conflicting with the public ones. My point is that a stable modus vivendi represents a more realistic device of inclusion. If the inclusion via overlapping consensus requires people to be ‘reasonable’, that is, to underwrite a civic morality as featuring the well- ordered and stable society, the ‘unreasonable’ turn out to be excluded from citizenry. My point is that the fair society may reach stability without moral consensus. The fair society may be stable although a group or more groups of citizens do not endorse its moral essentials . These people are expected to be loyal to institutions although their loyalty could be unlikely wholehearted. However, a partial loyalty does not imply the risk to undermine peace and coexistence. On the contrary the so-called unreasonable may be citizens on the same footing as the other albeit their citizenship would be backed by non-sharable motives, that is, by non-public reasons. These motives may indeed derive from their own traditions – be they habits, customs, beliefs, attachments, the not chosen features of belonging to their group