Causality and explanation: A reply to two critiques

Philosophy of Science 64 (3):461-477 (1997)
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Abstract

This paper discusses several distinct process theories of causality offered in recent years by Phil Dowe and me. It addresses problems concerning the explication of causal process, causal interaction, and causal transmission, whether given in terms of transmission of marks, transmission of invariant or conserved quantities, or mere possession of conserved quantities. Renouncing the mark-transmission and invariant quantity criteria, I accept a conserved quantity theory similar to Dowe's--differing basically with respect to causal transmission. This paper also responds to several fundamental constructive criticisms contained in Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of both the mark-transmission and the conserved quantity theories

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References found in this work

Causality without counterfactuals.Wesley C. Salmon - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):297-312.
Salmon on explanatory relevance.Christopher Read Hitchcock - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):304-320.
Van Fraassen on Explanation.Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (6):315.
Causality and conserved quantities: A reply to salmon.Phil Dowe - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):321-333.

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