Intentionality without exotica

In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2010)
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Abstract

The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.

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2010-09-20

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Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-233.
Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?Sarah Sawyer - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):264-283.
Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects).Angela Mendelovici - 2024 - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer. pp. 133--156.

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