Abstract

In this dissertation I address the relationship between analytic epistemology and metaphysical naturalism. I assess a variety of arguments that purport to show how evolutionary considerations support epistemological concerns. ;I present and criticize three arguments that attempt to connect epistemological requirements with evolution. These accounts include Ramsey's Evolutionary Reliabilism , Sober's representationist argument for the Evolution of Rationality , and Dennett's interpretationist account of the Evolution of Interpretive Capacities . I argue that each account fails to connect evolutionary considerations with the epistemic goal of having reliable or rational cognitive faculties. ;I conclude that evolutionary considerations provide no reason to think that humans routinely satisfy the reliability or rationality conditions required for knowledge. While humans might, in fact, satisfy the conditions for knowledge, the fact that our cognitive faculties are the product of evolution does not support the claim that our cognitive faculties are reliable or rational. In this sense, my conclusion is that skeptical challenges and theoretical objections raised in analytic epistemology should not be met by appeal to evolutionary considerations