Abstract

Turiel and colleagues divided norms into two kinds: Moral norms and conventional norms. Moral norms are universal, concerned with welfare, justice, fairness, equality and/or rights, and rule/authority independent. Conventional norms are local, rule/authority dependent, and concerned with maintaining social coordination, preserving tradition, and avoiding punishment. This account has been challenged, and the existence of a crisp distinction remains debatable. In this paper, I defend a version of the moral/conventional distinction on the basis that people generally judge norms concerned with welfare violations as moral, and that they distinguish between the morality of the action and that of the agent. I argue that we can make sense of the mixed data because people differ in how they perceive harm. Harm perception, rather than “objective” harm, is the relevant variable in knowing how people judge norms. To illustrate this, I explore why people perceive norms differently and how the moral/conventional distinction is reflected not only between cultures, but within them too. This should prompt us to reimagine the moral/conventional distinction to account for this diversity in perceptions. Doing away with the distinction risks misrepresenting both inter- and intra-cultural diversity in perceptions of harm.