Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments?

Erkenntnis 89 (8):2985-3003 (2024)
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Abstract

In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled “aesthetic”, and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating “aesthetic” judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment that is in need of, or can be subject to, distinctive theorizing. We advance our argument primarily through demonstrating that leading contemporary accounts of aesthetic judgment do not successfully distinguish a type of judgment in that they do not tell us how making an aesthetic judgment differs substantially from judging that 2 + 3 = 5, that football is entertaining, or that today is Tuesday.

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Author Profiles

Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
University of Toronto, Mississauga
David Sackris
Arapahoe Community College

Citations of this work

Are there "Moral" Judgments?David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2):(A1)1-24.

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References found in this work

Autonomy and Aesthetic Engagement.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1127-1156.
Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.
Aesthetic Rationality.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):113-140.

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