A Problem of Variability

Philosophical Writings 40 (1):48-66 (2012)
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Abstract

Recently Dimitria Electra Gatzia has argued that individual colour variations present difficulties for both colour objectivism and colour subjectivism (Gatzia 2010). On the objectivist side, she has singled out Byrne and Hilbert’s colour physicalism for criticism (Byrne and Hilbert 2003; 2007). The aim of this paper is to defend Byrne and Hilbert’s colour physicalism against an argument of Gatzia’s.

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2024-11-27

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Douglas Ryan
University of Sheffield (PhD)

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References found in this work

Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.

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