The Debates on Scientific Realism

In Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism. Springer International Publishing (2021)
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Abstract

This is the first chapter of Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism. The debate on scientific realism results from a tension between the empiricist methodology, which is a defining feature of science, and claims to the effect that science can unveil the fundamental nature of reality. What distinguishes realist and anti-realist positions is not necessarily that the former take scientific knowledge “at face value” or take the side of scientists in general while the latter do not. Rather, realists and anti-realists propose different ways of interpreting science as a whole, and in particular its aim, its possible achievements and its content. The aim of this book is to defend an interpretation that potentially applies to each of these three levels: modal empiricism. This position purports to be the articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science. This introductory chapter briefly presents the position, then outlines the structure of the book.

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Quentin Ruyant
Universidade de Lisboa

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Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett & John G. Collier.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - In James Ladyman & Don Ross, Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. New York: Oxford University Press.

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