Abstract

The moral authority of advance directives (ADs) in the context of persons living with dementia (PLWD) has sparked a multifaceted debate, encompassing concerns such as authenticity and the appropriate involvement of caregivers. Dresser critiques ADs based on Parfit's account of numeric personal identity, using the often‐discussed case of a PLWD called Margo. She claims that dementia leads to a new manifestation of Margo emerging, which then contracts pneumonia. Dworkin proposes that critical interests, concerning one's higher moral values, trump experiential interests (things or activities one enjoys because they are pleasurable). Dresser argues that Margo's current experiential interests override her self's critical ones, as they contribute significantly to her quality of life (QoL). To render the argument more realistic, I introduce a variation in which Margo develops delirium, a common and severe comorbidity in PLWD. I argue that delirium could precipitate a sudden decline in experiential interests and, consequently, a deterioration in QoL. Given the uncertain trajectory of Margo's illness, I contend that her competent self's critical interests, as reflected in her AD, along with her right to self‐ownership, should take precedence over current experiential interests. Thus, the AD possesses moral authority. However, it is imperative for healthcare professionals to offer consultations for PLWD, facilitating an understanding of ADs and enabling a shared decision‐making process. Such consultations are essential for honouring the autonomy and dignity of PLWD, ensuring that their values and preferences guide ethical decision‐making amidst the complexities of dementia care.