Abstract

The argument from moral disagreement contends that if moral realism is true, there would not be the kind of moral disagreement that there is and hence, that moral realism is false. Convergentist moral realists grant that a particular kind of moral disagreement would pose a problem for moral realism but argue that the moral disagreements of which we have empirical evidence are not that kind. To do so they offer alternative, defusing explanations of them. I critique two such defusing explanations. The first argues that these disagreements are not the right kind because their disputants agree about moral values (C. D. Meyers 2013). I argue that it fails because it commits moral realism to a convergence on moral values which does not obtain. The second argues that these disagreements are not the right kind because their moral disputants’ views were not formed with a method that moral realists think provides epistemic access to moral facts (i.e., reflective equilibrium) (Fitzpatrick 2014). I argue that it fails because it requires reflective equilibrium to generate a convergence that it probably does not and if reflective equilibrium generates convergence in idealized conditions, this defusing explanation does not preserve the epistemic access that convergentists seek to preserve. Hence, I argue, convergentists have reason to be cautious about endorsing reflective equilibrium as the sole method of moral inquiry. I then consider a version of the argument from moral disagreement that argues that the best explanation of contemporary philosophers’ disagreement about our objective reasons for action is that there are no such reasons (Leiter 2021). I argue that that they have different evidence is a better explanation.