Husserlian phenomenology and scientific realism

Philosophy of Science 54 (2):222-232 (1987)
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Abstract

Husserl's (1970) discussion of "Galilean science" is often dismissed as naïvely instrumentalist and hostile to science. He has been explicitly criticized for misunderstanding idealization in science, for treating the lifeworld as a privileged conceptual framework, and for denying that science can in principle completely describe the world (because ordinary prescientific concepts are irreplaceable). I clarify Husserl's position concerning realism, and use this to show that the first two criticisms depend upon misinterpretations. The third criticism is well taken. Nevertheless, this is consistent with Husserl's fundamental claim that the manifestations of things are important to discuss, but are inaccessible to empirical science

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Joseph Rouse
Wesleyan University

Citations of this work

From Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Approaches to Realist Perspectivism.Mahdi Khalili - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4):1-26.
What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?Harald A. Wiltsche - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):105-130.
Reality in Perspectives.Mahdi Khalili - 2022 - Dissertation, Vu University Amsterdam
The pregnancy of the real: A phenomenological defense of experimental realism.Shannon Vallor - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1 – 25.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 60-105.
Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin (ed.) - 1984 - University of California Press.
Quotation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - In Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 79–92.

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