Change, choice and inference: a study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning

New York: Oxford University Press (2001)
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Abstract

Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial intelligence. It elaborates on the relevant theories and provides a mathematically precise foundation for the thesis that large parts of theoretical reason can be subsumed under practical reason.

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Hans Rott
Universität Regensburg

Citations of this work

The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff, Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.
Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Eric Pacuit - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of belief. London: Springer.
Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.

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