Scanlon’s modal metaphysics

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):856-876 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In Being Realistic About Reasons T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary only in a weaker sense.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43.
Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality.Rafael Graebin Vogelmann - 2023 - Ethic@: An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 22 (1).
A Critique of Scanlon's Contractualism.Ashley Purdy - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):700-713.
Objectivity and reliability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):841-855.
Against Moral Contingentism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):209-217.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-04-27

Downloads
193 (#131,498)

6 months
36 (#112,787)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gideon Rosen
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.
Standing up for supervenience.Bart Streumer - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):138-154.
Moral laws and moral worth.Elliot Salinger - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2347-2360.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder, Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.

View all 26 references / Add more references