Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited

Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333 (2021)
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Abstract

This paper defends the heretical view that, at least in some cases, we ought to assign legal liability based on purely statistical evidence. The argument draws on prominent civil law litigation concerning pharmaceutical negligence and asbestos-poisoning. The overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls that result from supposing that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.

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Lewis Ross
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.
The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.

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References found in this work

Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

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