Abstract

Despite the detrimental consequences of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), the role of monitoring and incentive-based corporate governance (CG) mechanisms in mitigating stakeholder mismanagement has been largely neglected in the literature. At the same time, there has been growing interest in holding executives accountable for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance by linking their compensation to related targets. However, prior research provides scant and inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of ESG pay in curbing CSiR. This study addresses these shortcomings and contributes to the emerging CSiR/CG literature by harnessing an institution-based view on executive compensation. Specifically, it recognizes national culture as the “missing determinant” in comparative CG studies and investigates the culturally-driven boundary conditions for the relationship between ESG pay and CSiR. The hypotheses were tested on a data set of 4066 firms from 56 countries during 2010–2020. The analysis supports a negative, though modest, effect of ESG pay on CSiR. Furthermore, the study shows that this relationship varies in statistical and economic significance across cultural contexts. Particularly, incentives prove effective for firms headquartered in nations characterized by low power distance, individualism, low uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. Conversely, in other settings, compensation linked to ESG may either lack motivational impact or even yield counterproductive outcomes. These findings have implications for both the CSiR and CG literature, as well as for practice.