Abstract

Is Aristotle's ethics altruistic? The text often seems at odds with itself on this question, and there is no critical consensus. This thesis begins with a thorough study of Aristotle's conception of the fine ,$ which he describes as both the end $ of virtue and that which motivates us to extend virtuous treatment to others. I dispute the altruistic "common good" interpretation of Terence Irwin and offer a nonaltruistic account in terms of Aristotle's conception of the fitting and the praiseworthy; my interpretation, I argue, is better grounded in both the text and pre-Aristotelian tradition. Next, the Aristotelian virtues are analyzed individually for elements of altruism. Here, too, evidence of altruism is absent; the virtues are grounded not in the good of others but in Aristotle's doctrine of the fine. Aristotle's ethics, I conclude, is not altruistic, but neither is Aristotle an egoist; both altruism and egoism conceive ethics along what I call the "self-other axis," whereas Aristotle conceives it, rather, along the axis of good and bad