Uma solução não convencional para o problema de Gettier

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (2):26-50 (2012)
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Abstract

The Gettier Problem (henceforth GP) is a milestone in contemporary epistemology. Half a century after the philosophical earthquake caused by the well-known Gettier article (1963), solutions continue to appear and the discussion resurfaces. Because we, like many, choose to adopt an optimistic stance towards the possibility of finding a plausible answer to the GP, in this paper we present an unconventional solution to solve it. Crucially, we argue that the only plausible and non-falsifiable definition of the propositional knowledge is the one given by an “open” formula that contains a placeholder or a “variable” – on the third necessary condition – which takes a value according to which, depending on the circumstances, is necessary and sufficient for epistemic success

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A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
An analysis of factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.

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