Naturalized epistemology and the is/ought gap

Dialectica 50 (2):137-152 (1996)
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Abstract

SummaryThis article discusses whether a naturalistic philosopher should endorse the epistemological version of the “is/ought gap” thesis. Quine thinks that there is an epistemological gap between normative epistemology and normative ethics, but I claim that anybody holding his naturalistic and holistic views has good reasons to deny the existence of a gap separating either epistemology from ethics or descriptive discourse from nonnative discourse. I maintain that both gaps can be bridged if one adopts, like Quine, a holistic view of justification. Although justification in science, epistemology and ethics are different in certain respects, holism accounts for the justification of scientific, epistemological and ethical beliefs at a general level.

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Javier Rodríguez
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

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