El nominalisme en metafísica

Quaderns de Filosofia 1 (1):13-35 (2014)
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Abstract

El nominalisme té almenys dues varietats. Una consisteix en el rebuig dels objectes abstractes; l’altra, en el rebuig dels universals. Les dues varietats del nominalisme són independents entre si i cadascuna pot defensar-se consistentment sense l’altra, per bé que comparteixen algunes motivacions i arguments. Aquest article exposa les teories nominalistes de les dues varietats.

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Citations of this work

Es pot naturalitzar la intencionalitat?Marc Artiga - 2016 - Quaderns de Filosofia 3 (2):83-119.

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References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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