Some nonhuman animals can have pains in a morally relevant sense

Biology and Philosophy 12 (1):51-71 (1997)
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Abstract

In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.

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William Robinson
Iowa State University

Citations of this work

Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Minding mammals.Adam Shriver - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):433-442.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.

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