Abstract

This paper discusses a new aporia, the aporia of future directed beliefs. This aporia contains three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is infallible that believes something about the future that is not historically settled, (2) it is necessary that someone is infallible if and only if it is necessary that everything she believes is true, and (3) it is necessary that all our beliefs are historically settled. Every claim in this set is intuitively plausible, and there are interesting arguments for or against each of them. Nevertheless, {(1), (2), (3)} entails a contradiction. Consequently, at least one of the sentences in this set must be false. I consider some possible solutions to the problem and discuss some arguments for and against these solutions. Five solutions, in particular, stand out. Three solutions reject (1), one solution rejects (2), and one solution rejects (3). No solution is without problems, and it is not obvious which one we should choose. Yet, we have to give up at least one sentence in {(1), (2), (3)}. This is the nature of an aporia.