De Dicto Harm and the Non-Identity Problem

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the examination of Caspar Hare's de dicto approach to the non-identity problem and specifically the non-identity case of The Inconsiderate Mother. On the de dicto approach an act can be wrong if it makes things de dicto worse for a role, even if that act does not make things worse for any actual person that fills that role. In this paper I provide a brief overview and reconstruction of Hare's argument. I argue that objections to Hare's arguments due to David Wasserman do not give us reason to dismiss the de dicto approach. Lastly I consider an objection to the effect that Hare's solution to the non-identity problem is ad hoc. I conclude that the de dicto approach faces some challenges but that we cannot readily dismiss it.

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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Can we harm and benefit in creating?Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.
The paradox of future individuals.Gregory S. Kavka - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2):93-112.
The non-identity problem.James Woodward - 1986 - Ethics 96 (4):804-831.

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