Tracing the identity of objects

Psychological Review 113 (1):1-30 (2006)
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Abstract

This article considers how people judge the identity of objects (e.g., how people decide that a description of an object at one time, t₀, belongs to the same object as a description of it at another time, t₁). The authors propose a causal continuer model for these judgments, based on an earlier theory by Nozick (1981). According to this model, the 2 descriptions belong to the same object if (a) the object at t₁ is among those that are causally close enough to be genuine continuers of the original and (b) it is the closest of these close-enough contenders. A quantitative version of the model makes accurate predictions about judgments of which a pair of objects is identical to an original (Experiments 1 and 2). The model makes correct qualitative predictions about identity across radical disassembly (Experiment 1) as well as more ordinary transformations (Experiments 2 and 3).

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Features of similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.

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