Abstract

A widespread commonplace in contemporary continental philosophy is that an idealistic metaphysics of mind - in the wake of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or Gentile - on the one hand, and a consistently “scientific” description and explanation of human experience and social praxis, on the other, are two quite irreconcilable theoretical enterprises. Although a philosophical clarification of languages, methodologies, and results of the particular sciences is generally held to be unavoidable by the scientists themselves, most epistemologists would still maintain that it must necessarily be “analytic” or, at best, phenomenological in character. It is certainly one of the most remarkable merits of Errol Harris’ philosophy of science to have shown that, on the contrary, only a genuine Hegelian dialectical epistemology is actually able to discover, articulate, and justify the ultimate conceptual presuppostions of 20th century scientific thought. The Harris project is gaining more and more recognition within and influence on today’s epistemology.