How to Incorporate Non-Epistemic Values into a Theory of Classification

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (1):1-28 (2022)
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Abstract

Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification, discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values.

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Author Profiles

Thomas A. C. Reydon
Universität Hannover
Marc Ereshefsky
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Species.Marc Ereshefsky - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
From naturalness to materiality: reimagining philosophy of scientific classification.David Ludwig - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-23.
Ontological pluralism and social values.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 104 (C):61-67.
Natural Kinds as Homeorhetic Dynamic Systems.Davide Serpico & Francesco Guala - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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