Plato’s Anti-Hedonism and the Protagoras by J. Clerk Shaw

Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (2):334-335 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Shaw introduces an important and compelling line of argumentation concerning the relationship between pleasure and the good into the literature on Plato’s dialogues with ramifications beyond any commitment that Plato has Socrates make to hedonism at Protagoras 351b–357e. To appreciate Shaw’s argument, the term ‘hedonism’ must be understood to indicate that the good is identical to bodily pleasure—not to both sensate and modal pleasure understood as a dichotomy, and not to all pleasures of the soul and body understood as a blended, commensurable, spectrum. Chapter 1 characterizes hedonism in a narrower way..

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,225

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-30

Downloads
22 (#971,181)

6 months
8 (#580,966)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Naomi Reshotko
University of Denver

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references