On Kinds of Things and Cognitive Idealism

Idealistic Studies 46 (1):1-17 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Whatever we can appropriately claim about reality has to be presented via a construct built from materials provided by our minds—our thought and deliberation—rather than something mandated unilaterally by reality itself. Our epistemic situation is such that neither reality alone and therefore rigorous realism nor yet our view of it has the entire story to itself. Their entanglement is such that in the end there has to be a negotiation that acknowledges their inseparable interlinkage in the constitution of our knowledge.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-05-20

Downloads
20 (#1,099,492)

6 months
6 (#622,431)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references