Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too

In J. C. Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflation and Paradox. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Restricting the T‐schema to Solve the Liar.Jared Warren - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):238-258.
The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Yablo's paradox.Graham Priest - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):236-242.
Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.

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